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The Externalization of Domestic Regulation:
Intellectual Property Rights Reform in a Global Era
PAUL N. DOREMUS
Intellectual property rights (IPR) issues in the software,
biotechnology, and semiconductor industries exemplify the pressure
that new technologies and international competition are placing on
domestic and international regulatory systems. Traditional patent
and copyright rules cannot easily accommodate any of these
technologies. At the same time, the high costs of research and
development, relative ease of replication, and global markets
characteristic of these technologies heighten the importance of both
domestic and foreign IPR protection. In the context of rapidly
changing technological conditions, borderless markets, and inflexible
international regimes, national policymakers face a political dilemma:
how to accommodate new technologies at home, encourage similar
accommodation abroad, and do both without undermining either
long-standing domestic IPR arrangements or the international patent
and copyright regimes. This article reviews the different strategies of
externalization associated with IPR reform in the software,
biotechnology, and semiconductor industries. Variations across these
cases indicate that fundamentally different technological, market, and
political conditions can lead to different strategies for equilibrating
incompatible and highly contested domestic and international
regulatory rules.
* Senior Analyst at the U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, responsible
for analyses of regulatory, tax, and legal policies that affect corporate innovation and competitiveness. Mr.
Doremus received a M.A. and Ph. D. from Cornell University. Mr. Doremus has researched and written on
various topics related to corporate technology development, national innovation systems, intellectual
property rights, multinational corporations, and international trade, investment, and competition. The
research and views expressed in this article are the sole reponsibility of the author and do not in any way
reflect the work or the policies of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Congress created the first new intellectual property right (IPR) in
nearly a century. The legislation, which became the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA), established a sui generis form of IPR
protection for semiconductor chip products, a set of rights designed solely for
semiconductor technology and statutorily separate from either copyright or
patent law.' The SCPA is notable not only for its unique contribution to
domestic IPR law, but also for its unique approach to coordinating domestic
and foreign IPR rules. Instead of abiding by the national treatment provisions
of the international patent and copyright regimes, the SCPA links domestic and
foreign IPR rules through bilateral reciprocity based on "substantial similarity"
to U.S. rules.2 The rule of national treatment would have required the United
States to provide the same IPR terms to foreign as to domestic intellectual
property owners in the U.S. market, while accepting whatever IPR terms
foreign countries established for semiconductor products in their own markets
-which, at the time, were literally nothing. Instead, the SCPA borrowed a
more coercive technique from contemporary trade policy: the United States
will grant IPR protection for foreign semiconductor products only if the
property owner's home country establishes IPR rules similar to those in the
SCPA. By most measures, this fairly coercive tactic has been rather
successful. Japan negotiated interim reciprocity almost immediately and was
followed quickly by several European nations. Numerous countries
subsequently negotiated reciprocal protection with the United States.
The primary congressional sponsor of the legislation, Robert W.
Kastenmeier, hailed the SCPA as "pav[ing] the way" for innovative policy
1. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (Supp. 111984)). Until the 1984 legislation, the U.S. Congress had not created a new
intellectual property right since 1881, when it recognized trademarks as protectable property. As a general
term, "intellectual property" encompasses four categories of rights. The two primary categories, patents and
copyrights, date to the U.S. Patent and Copyright Acts of 1790 and are rooted in Art. I Sec. 8 of the
Constitution; the third, trademark protection, dates to 1881; and the fourth, semiconductor mask works, dates
to 1984. There are also two somewhat lesser categories of intellectual property which are regulated at the
state level: trade secrets and misappropriation of other proprietary information. These are much weaker
forms of protection, being based less on property rights per se than on variable notions of fair business
practices.
2. The SCPA also allows for reciprocity via multilateral treaty, but the provision is virtually
meaningless. No multilateral treaty existed in 1984, and none was expected in the near future-despite the
efforts of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to create one. To a large extent, the bilateral
mechanism established by the SCPA obviated the need for a multilateral treaty.
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responses to new information-based technologies that fall outside the range of
patent and copyright law, including such important technologies as
biotechnology, software, and computer data bases.' But instead of taking the
newly paved road, Congress and the courts have hesitated and chosen different
routes with each of these new technologies. Semiconductor technology has
prompted the most radical departure from traditional IPR rules: the United
States legislated sui generis domestic protection and sought international
coordination through bilateral reciprocity. Biotechnology has prompted an
entirely different response: U.S. courts have accommodated biotechnology
innovations by expanding the scope of patent law, and the United States (along
with the European Union and Japan) has sought international coordination
through the patent regime. IPR developments for software have shifted
substantially over time. In 1980, Congress formally extended copyright
protection to software, and did so in a manner consistent with the international
copyright regime (even though neither of the international copyright
conventions formally recognizes software copyrights). Since the mid-1980s,
however, the politics of IPR reform for software have become considerably
more complicated. At home, the courts have widened the scope of copyright
protection for software and have even accorded patent rights to certain forms
of software,4 developments that have injected considerable uncertainty into
U.S. IPR rules for software and further fueled already serious discord within
the software industry over the proper scope and form of IPR protection.
Abroad, the United States has pursued a series of Section 301 investigations
centering on software copyright violations, representing a relatively coercive
strategy for coordinating domestic and foreign copyright rules.'
3. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?., 70 MINN. L. REv. 417,468-69 (1985).
4. Software per se is not patentable. The types of software patents that have been granted are for
patentable inventions that include software components or software-controlled processes. Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175 (1981); In re Alappat, 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Lowry, 32 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1031 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See also U.S. DEP'T OF COM., PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PROPOSED
EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED INVENTIONS ( 1995). Patentability criteria for
software-related inventions remain uncertain in many respects. As technological developments blur the
distinctions between hardware and software, and between tangible machines and data structures or programs,
the scope and applicability of software patents will likely become even more contentious than it is today.
5. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, essentially provides the U.S. Trade
Representative with the power to investigate unfair trade practices in foreign countries, and, under certain
circumstances, to impose retaliatory sanctions. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq.) (as amended by The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-573, 98 Stat.
2948, and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107).
1996]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
Reforming domestic and foreign IPR rules to accommodate new,
information-intensive technologies entails multiple political and economic
factors operating at different levels and in different arenas. The technologies
are complex, rapidly changing, and not easily accommodated by traditional
classes of IPR. The markets involved are global, highly competitive, and
integrally linked to other economic sectors. Consequently, the policy dilemma
is simultaneously domestic and international, and the policy arena typically
spans several sectors and competing political interests. In essence, IPR policy
is no longer a matter of domestic regulatory choices alone. Changes in U.S.
patent and copyright laws automatically have international implications due
to U.S. participation in the international patent and copyright regimes as well
as the recently negotiated Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Furthermore, many new information-intensive
technologies are created in and used by highly global industries, which not
only heightens the importance of having cognate IPR protection in foreign
markets but also exposes the domestic reform process to international
economic considerations.
This article develops two general analytical propositions for interpreting
and explaining how U.S. IPR policy has accommodated technological change,
on both domestic and international fronts. First, international economic factors
affect domestic IPR reform choices in ways that vary with the market structure
of the affected industries. Specifically, different types of markets convey
different degrees of trade leverage: the greater the trade leverage, the more
likely externalization strategies will be coercive and bilateral; the lesser the
trade leverage, the more likely externalization strategies will be cooperative
and multilateral.
Second, the style of accommodation and externalization associated with
IPR reform must be viewed relative to the domestic political settlement
between affected producers and users, whether they are competing producers,
dependent users, or even economically unrelated industries (as can occur when
existing holders of related property rights may perceive a threat to their
interests). Like all forms of regulation, IPR rules embody adversarial political
relationships. IPR reform pits contrary societal interests against each other in
the courts and in Congress, where public officials seek to balance the interests
of intellectual property owners against those of users-not just individual users
but also the public at large, which benefits over the long run from the
development and dissemination of new knowledge. Consequently, as the
[Vol. 3:341
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political and economic consequences of IPR reform become more acute for
specific domestic actors (which often happens as technologies mature),
coalitional conflicts can rise to the degree that IPR reform becomes much more
problematic and prone to stalemate. Under conditions of domestic legal
uncertainty and coalitional conflict, U.S. policymakers cannot easily pursue
coercive externalization strategies.
Although both market structure and domestic politics are highly
influential, neither is fully determinative. The politics of IPR reform
invariably involve a complicated relationship between international economic
pressures and the domestic political dynamic that emerges from the politics of
adversarial regulation. The full story of IPR reform is rarely compact, nor is
the policy problem straightforward and easily negotiated. In this kind of
territory, theoretical propositions are necessarily contingent.
In the broadest sense, then, this article investigates the inexorable
pressures of technological change and economic globalization on domestic
regulatory policy. In essence, the globalization of commerce and capital has
redefined the concept and practice of trade to include international transactions
in services as well as global exchanges of knowledge and technology. Many
of these new forms of global economic exchange have internationalized the
scope and impact of domestic policy. International flows of goods and
services as well as technology and capital are increasingly entwined with a
range of fundamental domestic regulatory policies, including not only IPR but
also investment, taxation, antitrust, environmental, and numerous other forms
of regulation. The very nature of these relationships demands an
interdisciplinary analytical perspective because they inherently involve law,
public policy, foreign economic policy, and international political economy.
In essence, one needs new analytical tools and theoretical frameworks to better
understand the relationship between technological change, international
competition, and domestic regulatory policy during a period that some now
call "the global era."'
The following section begins this analytical agenda by introducing the
cases and describing the two fundamental dilemmas associated with IPR in
advanced information-based industries. First, for innovators, obtaining
adequate IPR protection is increasingly both important and uncertain. Second,
for policymakers, the coordination of domestic and foreign IPR rules is
simultaneously necessary yet difficult to achieve through traditional routes.
6. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMrNISrRATIVE LAW IN A GLoBAL ERA (1992).
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In each of the three cases considered in this article-software, biotechnology,
and semiconductors-the United States has sought to externalize domestic
regulatory reform in substantially different ways, for reasons that are explored
in Part III.
H. NEW TECHNOLOGIES, NEW IPR RULES, AND DIFFERENT
STYLES OF EXTERNALIZATION
This article examines U.S. IPR reform by comparing three case studies
involving the software, biotechnology, and semiconductor industries. Each of
these industries produces goods whereby the value of the information content
far exceeds the value of the physical product on which the information is
stored; indeed, information itself is the primary product. The cases are further
similar in that they each involve leading-edge, information-intensive industries
that are highly international, intensely competitive, and rapidly changing.
Moreover, each involves technologies that confound the two main classes of
intellectual property-patents and copyrights."
Despite these fundamental similarities, each case represents a different
process of domestic accommodation and a different style of externalizing
domestic regulatory reform. Software has been granted copyright protection
and limited patent protection, while the externalization strategy has varied over
time; biotechnology has been accommodated through expanded patent rights
that have been cooperatively externalized through multilateral channels; and
semiconductor technology has been granted a sui generis IPR accompanied by
coercive externalization conditions (see Table 1). In short, the analytical
problem can be approached with the classic method of comparing similar cases
with divergent outcomes.
7. Intellectual property law for biotechnology is unique in that the extension of property rights to
life forms invokes ethical and moral issues that often conflict with market development and competitiveness
concerns. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PATENTING LIFE (1989).
[Vol. 3:341
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Table 1: Varying Styles of Externalization
Cooperative Coercive
Externalization Externalization
Software, pre-1985 Through multilateral
channels






In the United States, the traditional justification for providing IPR
protection in any industry is based on two simple but powerful assumptions:
first, that innovators are motivated by the prospect of reward; and second, that
society benefits from innovation by virtue of the economic and cultural growth
that ensues. Given these assumptions, the state grants innovators limited
monopoly rights in exchange for making the innovation public. Innovators
benefit from the economic power of the monopoly, and society benefits from
the generation and dissemination of new ideas.' By this logic, inadequate IPR
protection eviscerates the incentive to innovate, which over the long run
dampens economic growth and cultural advancement.
New information-intensive technologies are particularly vulnerable to
inadequate IPR protection because most can be disseminated very quickly and
reproduced relatively easily (and at a fraction of the cost of development).
Semiconductor chips can be reverse-engineered to decipher their design,
software products can be readily copied and decompiled to reveal their
8. Most property rights analysts accept that the rewards established by IPR are necessary to achieve
socially optimal amounts of innovation, although there is a dissenting tradition that argues that neither IPR
nor any other governmental support for innovative activity is necessary to achieve socially optimal
innovation rates. The classic justification for maintaining an IPR system is Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOcIAL FACTORS 609 (National Bureau of Economic Research ed., 1962). The
dissenting tradition dates to Arnold Plant's work in the mid-30s. Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of
Copyright in Books, I ECONOMICA 167 (1934); Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents
for Inventions, I ECONoMICA 30 (1934). More recent dissents include Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case
for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV.
281 (1970); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287(1988).
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structure, and biotechnology products can often be reproduced or readily
imitated. Moreover, the type of intellectual property characteristic of these
technologies cannot be protected through alternative channels, such as trade
secrets, because the sale of information products usually reveals the
commercially relevant proprietary information. In addition, the new
information industries can only rarely rely on lead time advantages to recoup
research and development (R&D) costs. R&D costs for these technologies
have skyrocketed, product cycles have shortened, and competitors have
improved their ability to rapidly replicate and market new technologies at a
cost equal to, if not substantially lower than, the costs of innovation. When
faced with imitative competitors who did not bear the considerable costs of
R&D, innovative firms lose the ability to price their products competitively.
Under these conditions, inadequate IPR protection can stifle innovation by
increasing the uncertainty and risk of R&D investment.
However great the need, though, it is extremely difficult to establish and
enforce IPR protection for these types of technologies. The root problem is
that information-intensive technologies tend to confound the criteria which
differentiate the main classes of intellectual property. Semiconductor and
software technology have characteristics that cross the borders of copyright
and patent law; biotechnology products by no means look like the industrial
inventions for which patent law was designed. In addition, new and powerful
reproduction and transmission technologies--such as advanced photocopiers,
audio and video recording devices, computers, electronic storage and retrieval
systems, satellites, and cable-have created unparalleled domestic and
international enforcement problems.
Herein lies the dilemma for innovators in the new information
technologies: their products are extraordinarily expensive to create yet
comparatively cheap to duplicate and disseminate, which makes adequate IPR
protection simultaneously more valuable and more problematic. The dramatic
costs of inadequate IPR protection have created political pressure for IPR
reform at home and abroad. In addition to the costs of lost markets and legal
uncertainties at home, U.S. intellectual property owners have been absorbing
increasingly large financial losses from inadequate intellectual property
protection abroad. Estimates reach $61 billion a year, which alone captures
[Vol. 3:341
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political attention.9 The economic and political significance of IPR protection
is magnified by the wide-ranging economic relevance of the new information
technologies, as their relative economic health and innovative capacity
reverberate throughout such critical manufacturing and service industries as
telecommunications, microelectronics, pharmaceuticals, and finance.
The natural difficulty of adjusting IPR rules to accommodate the new
information technologies is exacerbated by the inherently international
character of the industries involved. Unlike traditional trade in goods, the
commercial development and success of intellectual property products
frequently depends on foreign laws and enforcement actions. For all practical
purposes, the U.S. government simply cannot protect the [PR of its citizens
through domestic policy alone. To strengthen the effective protection
available to American intellectual property owners, the U.S. government must
also pursue stronger foreign and/or international rules and enforcement
practices.
For over a century, the primary channels for coordinating domestic and
foreign [PR rules have been the international patent and copyright regimes."0
Each regime is a formal system of rules created by treaty and administered by
an international organization. Neither regime establishes rights independently;
rather, they adjust in the wake of domestic change and gradually harmonize the
divergent patent and copyright rules of member states. IPR rules for new
technologies generally develop within the countries in which the technology
emerged, usually through an expansion or modification of either patent or
copyright laws. The international patent and copyright regimes then
harmonize domestic-level adjustments as they develop.
Most of the new information-based technologies emerged in the United
States, and the U.S. IPR system has often been the first to adapt to these
9. Pinpointing monetary losses resulting from inadequate IPR protection is notoriously difficult,
for it requires estimates of reduced profit margins, domestic and foreign sales displaced by infringing goods,
damage to corporate reputations, and business foregone for lack of adequate property rights. The first
comprehensive study of IPR-related business losses was conducted by the International Trade Commission
(ITC) in 1988; although problematic in many respects, their estimate that $43 to $61 billion is lost annually
remains a widely cited figure. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2065, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON US INDUSTRY AND TRADE (1988).
10. The international patent regime centers on the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (1883), which is administered through the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 13 U.S.T. I, 828 U.N.T.S. 107. The
international copyright regime centers on the Beine Convention on Copyrights, Sept. 9, 1886, 168 Consol.
T.S. 185 and the Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, the
former being administered through WIPO and the latter through the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
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technologies. Some IPR regimes have responded to particular technologies
more quickly than the United States, which appears to be the case with
copyright protection for computer databases in the European Union. Other
nations have avoided IPR reform altogether, whether for databases or any
other new information technology. Among those national IPR regimes that
have responded, there are considerable differences and inconsistencies in
approach and outcome.
The uncoordinated and divergent development of domestic IPR rules
magnifies the natural difficulty of coordinating IPR reform through the
international patent and copyright regimes. Despite years of effort, the WIPO
has gotten little support for its proposed multilateral treaty to protect
semiconductor mask works; neither of the copyright conventions explicitly
recognizes software copyrights, although many nations are treating software
copyrights in a manner consistent with the regime; and the WIPO's
consideration of biotechnology patents lags considerably behind domestic
developments in the United States, the European Union, and Japan.
Herein lies the dilemma for U.S. policymakers facing domestic pressure
for IPR reform at home and abroad: at the very time that international
coordination is most needed, it is simultaneously most unlikely. In the context
of rapidly, changing technologies, international markets, and inadequate
international regimes, national policymakers must decide how to adjust
domestic policy in a manner that appropriately accommodates the new
technologies at home and encourages similar accommodation abroad,
preferably without undermining the otherwise useful international IPR
regimes.
Different strategies of externalization carry different political implications.
As is the case in trade policy generally, a coercive approach to international
IPR reform could undermine foreign support for the particular policy goals and
perhaps damage the prospects for international cooperation in other areas. The
choice of forum-multilateral or bilateral-has equally wide-ranging
implications. The international patent and copyright regimes may move
slowly, but they do provide a sure and predictable method of coordinating
domestic and foreign IPR rules, which facilitates investment in technologies
that are financially sustainable only in global markets, as is generally the case
[Vol. 3:341
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in information-intensive technologies." In addition, the international
agreements help to disseminate new technology globally by reducing the
transaction costs of obtaining and enforcing exclusive rights in different
countries. Bilateral strategies may be quick and effective in the short term.
However, in the long run, they can introduce policy inconsistencies, create
interpretive difficulties for domestic businesses, increase administrative
complexity, and otherwise raise the transaction costs of obtaining IPR abroad
(as firms are compelled to seek intellectual property protection for the same
product in several countries with different standards and procedures). If it
circumvents the regimes, the United States could lose its ability to influence
how other nations and the international regimes accommodate the new
technologies and protect U.S. intellectual property products in general.
The broad political stakes and serious economic consequences of IPR
reform have exacerbated major cleavages in the world economy, cleavages
which not only set rich countries against poor but also set rich countries
against each other. Many countries do not even share the basic normative
underpinnings of western IPR concepts. For example, copying in traditional
Korean society is an expression of honor, not an infringement of an inherent
ownership right.' Other countries object to U.S.-style IPR protection on
straightforward economic grounds. Brazil, for example, has long denied IPR
protection for U.S. pharmaceutical products on the dual grounds that doing so
would lock Brazil into technological dependency and would also create an
enormous public health problem by making much needed pharmaceutical
products prohibitively expensive. 3 Given these conditions, it is of little
surprise that the United States has pursued high-profile bilateral trade disputes
designed to force individual countries to establish IPR rules consonant with the
IPR regimes (at least) and U.S. IPR rules (at best). The Reagan Administration
initiated this tactic and secured major dejure IPR revisions in Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Thailand. The Bush and Clinton
Administrations have carried the agenda forward, pressing bilateral IPR cases
1I. Because most markets for information-intensive products are global, the availability of foreign
IPR protection can significantly affect the R&D investment choices and market development strategies of
multinational firms.
12. See R. Michael Gadbaw, Republic of Korea, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL
CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? (1988).
13. See Claudio R. Frischtak, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and Industrial
Technology Development in Brazil, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 61, 61-98 (Francis W. Rushing & Carole Ganz
Brown eds., 1990).
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with China, Brazil, and other countries, and raising the political sights of the
United States to defacto as well as dejure IPR protection.'4
Although most of the advanced industrial states have [PR regimes with
similar normative underpinnings, there are nonetheless substantial conflicts
between them over the proper scope and terms of [PR protection. For instance,
the whole issue of designing IPR protection for semiconductor mask works
developed largely in response to powerful U.S. semiconductor manufacturers'
claims that Japanese copying of U.S. innovations led to the rapid and
devastating loss of the 64K DRAM market in the early 1980s."5 In a different
vein, large U.S.-based software producers have bitterly battled several
European countries, accusing them-all net importers of software-of
exploiting loopholes in the Berne Convention to avoid paying U.S. copyright
royalties. U.S. software producers, led by the Business Software Alliance, also
have turned to fairly dramatic legal efforts to combat corporate and residential
copying within the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), which they estimate deprives them of
several billion dollars annually in sales revenue. 6 [PR rules in many OECD
countries remain unclear or unsettled on software patents and decompilation
rights as well as on whether certain categories of biotechnology are patentable.
At a time when most OECD economies are shifting toward services and
information-based products, the problem of inadequate IPR protection has
taken on profound significance. Information and information-based products
and services are not just intrinsically valuable commodities; they also affect
productivity and competitiveness across numerous sectors. The character of
domestic and international [PR rules for new information-based technologies
14. United States' progress on international IPR issues and other trade disputes is documented on
an annual basis in two reports published by the U.S. Trade Representative. U.S. TRADE REP., THE TRADE
POLICY AGENDA AND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM (1986-1996); U.S. TRADE REP., NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERS (1986-1996). Annex 11 of the 1996 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 1995 ANNUAL REPORT provides
a comprehensive listing of formal trade agreements entered into by the United States since 1984. The annual
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATES provides the USTR's assessment of progress on IPR reform and other trade
matters on a country by country basis.
15. The accuracy of this claim is a matter of dispute, but there is no denying that U.S. semiconductor
producers made the claim frequently and were rarely questioned about it in policy circles.
16. The most recent survey conducted by the Business Software Alliance (BSA) estimates that
foreign piracy in the software publishing and distribution industries cost U.S. firms $15.2 billion in lost
revenue for 1994. BSA attempts to counter software piracy in foreign markets by conducting enforcement,
education, and public policy campaigns in over 60 countries. Since 1988, BSA has filed approximately 600
lawsuits worldwide against suspected infringers of software copyrights. BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE,
The Impact of Software Piracy on the International Marketplace, in ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
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can profoundly alter transborder data flows, trade in information products and
services, and trade in a wide range of information-intensive industries. Given
the central position of information-based technologies in the economic food
chain, the nature of IPR reform could strongly affect overall levels of
innovation and growth in the post-industrial service economies: inadequate
IPR protection raises the uncertainties and risks of conducting R&D, which
slows the pace of innovation and consequently could eviscerate the long-term
competitiveness of the economy's most critical growth sectors.
Serious political attention to the linkages between IPR protection,
innovation, and competitiveness emerged in the early 1980s, congruent with
a sense of impending crisis over the intractable trade and budget deficits as
well as the comparative decline in U.S. competitiveness in general. The
profound consequences of inadequate IPR protection became an important
topic not just in trade circles but also in rather high political circles, as
reflected in the 1985 report on the "new reality" of global competition
conducted by the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness:
Technological innovation is a mainstay of the American economy. It
is the foundation of our economic prosperity, our national security,
and our competitiveness in world markets. Yet, despite its
importance, technological innovation has not always been optimally
nurtured in America. One weakness in U.S. policy has been the lag
between the advances in technology and the adaptations of U.S.
intellectual property law to protect them .... If ownership rights are
not improved domestically and internationally, the United States will
limit its innovative capability and, consequently, its national economic
and social development for generations to follow. At a period when
other nations are focusing on ways to enhance their technological
base, the United States could well be left behind. 7
This concern with the implications of IPR rules for national
competitiveness has not been purely rhetorical. U.S. courts have been
17. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, 2 GLOBAL COMPETITION: THE NEW
REALrrY 306 (1985).
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according stronger proprietary rights to intellectual property owners,18
Congress has explicitly linked trade sanctions to foreign IPR conditions in the
1984 and 1988 Trade Acts, 9 and the Executive Branch has pursued foreign
IPR reform through Section 301 and related bilateral tactics.20
Such political attention to the link between IPR and international
competitiveness illustrates just one way in which the United States has been
grappling with profound changes in the international economy, changes that
have imposed new and distinct pressures upon domestic policy establishments.
The globalization of commerce and capital has redefined the concept and
practice of trade to include international transactions in services as well as
global exchanges of knowledge and technology. Many of these new forms of
global economic exchange have internationalized the scope and impact of
domestic policy. International flows of goods and services as well as
technology and capital are increasingly entwined with a range of domestic
regulatory policies, including not only IPR but also investment, tax, antitrust,
environmental, and other forms of regulation (see Table 2).
18. The evidence that U.S. IPR rules have shifted in favor of proprietary rights is compelling and
widely accepted. For one, the scope of intellectual property protection has been extended to previously
unprotected objects (such as life forms and mathematical algorithms). In addition, U.S. courts have been
ruling increasingly in favor of intellectual property owners; most often noted is the clearly pro-patent
decision record of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), which was established in 1982
to consolidate and systematize patent law. On the CAFC, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 26-30 (1989). According to one critic,
the CAFC has decided in favor of patent holders in over 60% of the cases heard; overall, "the CAFC has
greatly strengthened the presumption of patent validity and upheld royalties ranging from 5 to 33 percent."
Brian Kahin, The Sofhvare Patent Crisis, 93 TECH. REv. 57 (1990).
19. During the 1980s, Congress passed several legislative provisions that allowed trade retaliation
for inadequate IPR protection in foreign markets. See Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983,
26 U.S.C.A. § 6015, repealed (linking foreign aid to IPR protection); Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19
U.S.C.A. § 1654 (explicitly linking GSP preferences to the protection of U.S. IPR and also making foreign
IPR protection subject to direct trade retaliation through the Section 301 provisions of the Trade Act of
1974, supra note 5 (which is the principal statutory basis for addressing unfair or discriminatory foreign
government practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce-such as inadequate IPR protection.)); Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, supra note 5 (Special 301 provisions require the U.S. Trade
Representative to identify "priority" foreign countries that deny adequate and effective IPR protection and/or
fair and equitable market access for firms that rely on IPR protection and countries placed on this list
subsequently become the focus of increased bilateral attention).
20. As noted above, the USTR has successfully achieved IPR reform through bilateral trade disputes
with Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, China, Thailand, and others. See sources
cited supra notes 12, 13, & 14.
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Table 2: The Intersection of Domestic Regulation and
International Competition: Relevant Policy Arenas
Policy Arena Policy Instruments Affected Industries
Intellectual Patent, copyright, and Semiconductors, software,




Foreign Ownership limits; local Global manufacturing and
investment content rules; licensing service industries
and other technology
transfer rules
Taxation Investment credits; R&D Global manufacturing and
credits; depreciation rules; service industries
transfer pricing
Antitrust Merger and acquisition Oligopolistic industries,
rules and enforcement; such as aerospace,
R&D consortia; traditional semiconductors,
antitrust (pricing; market automotive,
concentration) telecommunications,
and-perhaps-software
Environmental Emissions and other Refrigerants, automotive,
regulation output rules; "green" electronics, forestry,
standards; take-back utilities
rules; design conventions
Standards Product quality, process Electronics, data
and interoperability processing, computers,
controls, health and safety software, biotechnology
Technology policy Direct and indirect forms Semiconductors and
of government R&D electronics, aerospace,
support; sector targeting; instruments, optics,
public/private alliances; advanced materials,
I procurement information technology
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For the most part, the trade implications of domestic regulatory policies
are not suitably addressed by contemporary international trade institutions.
The dominant postwar international institution for governing trade, the GATT,
applied only to trade in goods and consequently left an increasingly large part
of international economic relations uncovered. Largely as a result of U.S.
pressure, the Uruguay Round sought to expand the GATT's scope by
negotiating three agreements covering the "new trade issues"-the General
Agreement for Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).
At root, the Uruguay Round strategy of expanding and harmonizing
international IPR rules through the GATT/WTO represented an attempt to
thoroughly revise the long-standing rules of engagement structured by the
international patent and copyright regimes. The TRIPs agreement may
strengthen IPR protection worldwide and could change the rules of
international coordination through the enforcement power of trade retaliation.
However, the TRIPs agreement builds upon minimal rules in the existing IPR
regimes and does not address the manifold problems associated with
accommodating new information-intensive technologies.2 In addition to
having a narrow scope, the TRIPs mechanism has the additional liability of
being excruciatingly slow; it is far too cumbersome to accommodate the rapid
rate of technological change and economic development in new information-
based industries.
U.S. industry and the U.S. government consequently have been left to seek
alternative strategies for promoting foreign IPR reform. The primary strategic
choice is whether to remain within the confines of the international IPR
regimes, which in essence is a choice between multilateralism and bilateralism.
The United States has opted for a bilateral strategy with regard to
semiconductor mask works, but has retained an essentially multilateral strategy
with biotechnology and has used both mechanisms in software.' Whatever the
choice of forum, domestic reformers can pursue foreign accommodation either
21. As stated by the OECD, "A more fundamental approach appears to be needed in order to devise
internationally consistent rules that are aligned more closely with the characteristics of contemporary
knowledge generation, invention and diffusion." OECD, Science and Technology Policy: Review and
Outlook 1991,93 (1992).
22. The style of externalization in software may be confusing at first glance. Although the United
States has used coercive tactics such as Section 301 investigations, the goal has been to win foreign
adherence to the international copyright regime; accordingly, the strategy is essentially multilateral, despite
the aggressive attitude.
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coercively or cooperatively. The most cooperative strategy is to facilitate the
regime's harmonization process through international conferences, cross-
national policy reform discussions, and so forth-as has primarily been the case
with regard to biotechnology patent rules. Coercive tactics are somewhat
broader in range-the United States can encourage foreign adherence to regime
rules through "carrot and stick" tactics such as the reciprocity provisions of the
SCPA, or it can use even more forceful tactics such as the threat of trade
retaliation (as has been the case in software).
In short, the United States has used diverse styles of externalization to
accommodate IPR reform in new information-intensive technologies. The
following section begins the process of interpreting these differences,
developing lines of inquiry based on the particular market structure of the
affected industries as well as the political character of IPR regulation.
III. EXPLAINING STYLES OF EXTERNALIZATION: PUBLIC POLICY IN THE
CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
Until relatively recently, IPR policy and trade policy were entirely separate
arenas. Each had its own set of domestic laws and international agreements,
administered by entirely distinct agencies and organizations whose efforts
rarely required coordination. In their operations abroad, U.S. corporations
generally dealt with IPR matters on local terms, negotiating agreements with
individual governments on a case-by-case basis. However, in the late-1970s
and early-1980s, a number of changes in the international economic
environment rendered particular domestic industries increasingly vulnerable
to inadequate IPR protection abroad. That vulnerability led to private-sector
activism that ultimately dissolved the political and institutional barriers
between international trade and domestic IPR policy.
The first U.S. firms to target inadequate foreign IPR protection were
industries sensitive to trademark protection. In fact, the very idea of linking
IPR and trade dates to 1978, when the Levi Strauss Corporation began a
concerted effort to combat foreign counterfeiting of their trademark blue jeans.
Levi Strauss' first step was to strengthen border sanctions; it lobbied Congress
to add seizure and forfeiture provisions to Section 1526 of the Tariff Act of
1930, and Congress promptly obliged in the Customs Procedural Reform and
1996]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
Simplification Act of 1978.' In the spring of 1978, Levi Strauss went one
considerable step further. Encouraged by the adoption of "codes of
agreement" during the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, the company
banded together with a group of trademark-sensitive firms and pressed for an
anti-counterfeiting code. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
took up the cause and, despite introducing the initiative very late in the GATT
negotiations, nearly succeeded.' Although unsuccessful in the Tokyo Round,
Levi Strauss and the newly created International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition
(IACC) had set a powerful precedent: they had swung U.S. trade policy
behind the idea of linking IPR conditions to trade, and had firmly established
the desirability of a new international mechanism for coordinating national
IPR rules through the GATT.
By the early-1980s, some of the largest manufacturers of industrial and
leading-edge high technology products joined the trademark industries in
demanding improved foreign IPR protection. The pressure for foreign IPR
reform became more widespread and more urgent as the U.S. economy and
international trade in general became increasingly oriented around products
and services with a high intellectual property content. In addition, inadequate
IPR protection abroad became more costly as new product generations
commanded higher and higher R&D outlays at the same time that relatively
inexpensive reproduction technologies emerged.
These economic and technological trends brought diverse industries--
ranging from automotive products and agricultural chemicals to
pharmaceuticals and electronics-into the IPR debate. For the most part, these
industries have been interested in establishing foreign IPR rules equivalent to
those in the United States, or at least to those mandated by the international
patent and copyright regimes. Those ends alone have proven to be
challenging.
For new information-based technologies, the problem of achieving
adequate IPR protection has been doubly vexing, for these technologies do not
easily fit within existing categories of IPR. For example, domestic IPR
protection for the semiconductor, software, and biotechnology industries did
not take shape until relatively recently. In 1980, Congress extended the
Copyright Act of 1976 to software products, although the scope and form of
23. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1526. For an account of the anti-counterfeiting code in the
Tokyo Round, see William N. Walker, Private Initiative to Thwart the Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 4
WORLD ECON. 29 (1981).
24. Walker, supra note 23, at 29.
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that protection has remained highly contentious. The Supreme Court set the
precedent allowing patents for biotechnology products in 1980, with the
landmark Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision,25 and Congress created a sui
generis form of industrial property right for semiconductor mask works in
1984.
Because these technologies are so complex and unusual, and because the
industries that deploy them are largely international in scope, the politics of
adjusting domestic IPR rules invariably coexists with political pressure for
foreign IPR reform. The dual character of IPR reform in these technologies
suggests two lines of inquiry regarding externalization strategies. First,
because the entire problem of accommodating the new information
technologies emerged during a period of renewed political attention to
innovation and competitiveness, strategies of externalization are likely to be
shaped by the pressures of international competition. Second, because these
technologies have required fundamental adjustments to domestic IPR rules,
strategies of accommodation and externalization are also likely to be shaped
by the domestic political bargaining involved in creating and regulating new
forms of IPR. The interpretation and explaination of variances in
externalization strategies, in other words, requires a multi-level analysis: the
first stage involves outlining fundamental variances in market structure and
associated levels of trade leverage, while the second stage situates domestic
political conditions within that broader market context.
In. terms of market structure, the semiconductor, software, and
biotechnology industries are each relatively new and are based on rapidly
changing, information-intensive technologies. In addition, the markets for
each are global in the sense that products are developed, produced, and sold
on an international scale. However, neither condition is uniform. Technology
varies in terms of its level of development (developing or mature), and markets
vary roughly in terms of the product cycle (market creation, market expansion,
and market saturation). Accordingly, competition involving emerging
technologies in new markets tends to center on R&D and market creation-that
is, competition is a positive sum game. Competition involving mature
technologies in highly developed markets tends to be a more contentious battle
for market share; as technology disperses and markets become saturated,
competition invariably becomes a zero-sum game. Intermediate markets-
25. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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highly commercialized but not saturated--tend to be characterized by
competition for market expansion.
By extension, the political and economic implications of IPR reform
should vary across different technological and market circumstances. For
instance, in very developed markets involving mature technologies (like
semiconductors), IPR reform will tend to have immediate implications for
competition over market share. In new markets involving developing
technologies (like biotechnology), IPR reform will have more long-term
implications for economic competitiveness.26
The three industries assessed in this article nicely illustrate the relationship
between market structure and the political salience of IPR reform. At the time
of the SCPA, the commercial implications of IPR reform in semiconductors
were sobering." Large U.S.-based semiconductor firms had been steadily
losing market share to Japanese competitors, and attributed at least part of that
loss to inadequate IPR protection.2" The implications of IPR reform in
software have been significant but, arguably, less dramatic. U.S. software
firms clearly dominate world markets, such that inadequate IPR protection
threatens not their very existence (as semiconductor producers characterized
the stakes for themselves) but instead their ability to compete "fairly" in
domestic and foreign markets. The commercial implications of IPR reform in
biotechnology may also be significant but are less compelling than in
semiconductors or software. Since the technology remains largely
precommercial, IPR reform primarily affects the potential for developing new
products and markets. Consequently, IPR reform does not provoke immediate
trade conflicts.
In short, the different structural features of each market convey a different
degree of potential trade leverage for IPR reform. The semiconductor industry
has had a high degree; the software industry, a moderate yet increasing degree;
and the biotechnology industries, a relatively low degree. These variances
26. The character of IPR rules tends to vary with the technology's level of development. The scope
of IPR applied to developing technologies often is rather broad, and the terms generous; as knowledge
expands and the technology matures, the scope narrows and the terms become more specific and restrictive.
This pattern is generally more true of patents than copyrights, although the extension of copyrights to
software (and perhaps other utilitarian articles) tends to follow this pattern.
27. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., INT'L TRADE ADMIN., THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY (1983).
28. See The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 1201 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 66, 75-
82 (1983) (statements of Thomas Dunlap Jr., Intel Corporation, and Christopher K. Layton, intersil
Corporation).
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generate the hypothesis that trade leverage can shape IPR reform in particular
ways: the higher the trade leverage, the more likely that externalization
strategies will be coercive and bilateral; the lower the trade leverage, the more
likely that externalization strategies will be cooperative and multilateral.
However, although trade leverage may be highly influential, it is rarely
determining. IPR rules embody a fundamental domestic political tension. On
the positive side, IPR provide financial incentives to individual innovators,
incentives needed to promote creative activity and, over the long run,
maximize societal welfare through technological and economic growth. On
the negative side, IPR grant economic and legal powers to innovators that, if
too encompassing, can be used to extract excessive profits and restrict
competition-which, over the long run, would damage societal welfare. IPR,
in short, are a form of adversarial regulation. IPR rules distribute costs and
capabilities among competing groups that are in a zero-sum relationship (as
opposed to policies that regulate individuals or groups for their own individual
or collective benefit). 9
In essence, IPR rules represent a state-sanctioned distribution of power, a
form of social contract designed by the government to balance the rights of
innovators and users and to further society's interest in economic and cultural
innovation. IPR reform potentially affects not only the interests of prospective
rights holders and related users, but also the interests of long-standing rights
holders, whether or not they are in economically related arenas. Accordingly,
one would expect the politics of IPR reform to be shaped considerably by the
classic organizational and associational characteristics of affected groups--their
structure (concentrated or dispersed), their cohesiveness (cooperative or
conflictual), and the general nature of the policy cleavage (within an industry
or between industries).
29. This policy characterization is based on Lowi's policy typology, which was first outlined in
Theodore J. Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory, 16 WORLD
POLITICS 677 (1984). On the definitions of and distinctions among distributive, regulatory, redistributive,
and constituent policies, see Theodore J. Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice, in PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION REvIEW 298 (1972). As Lowi noted, adversarial regulation can involve either behavior
that is intrinsically undesirable (e.g. crime) or behavior that is undesirable only in its consequences (e.g.
monopolies); the critical condition is that one set of actors is being regulated to protect or enhance the
interests of an opposing set. IPR policy, along with similar forms of economic regulation (such as antitrust
regulation) and social regulation (such as environmental and civil rights regulation), clearly fits in the
category of behavior that matters because of its consequences. Wilson, to the contrary, treats social
regulation and regulation of competitive practices as different classes; his differentiation is based more on
the issues at stake than the fundamental relationships characteristic of adversarial regulation. See THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson, ed. 1980).
19961
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
Of course, the problem of adapting IPR rules to the new information
technologies is not simply a domestic matter. Choosing how to regulate
private gain and public welfare in the new information-based technologies
automatically assumes an international dimension, because private gain
involves foreign IPR rules and public welfare involves international
technologies in international markets. The global character of the new
information technologies exposes the politics of adversarial regulation to the
considerable pressures of trade and international competition.
In sum, the politics of IPR reform invariably involves a complicated
relationship between international economic pressures and the domestic
political dynamic that emerges from the politics of adversarial regulation. The
complex role and significance of variances in market structure and domestic
policy dynamics assumes full force when the three cases are viewed as a set.
The next section provides a brief and highly stylized explanatory overview of
the cases, illustrating the significance of a multilevel analysis of market
structures and political dynamics. Building theory around this type of research
question is, however, a highly contingent venture: the technologies and
industries are complex and rapidly changing, the pressures on domestic and
international rule systems are multitudinous and unrelenting, and the legal and
political responses to these pressures at home and abroad are multifaceted and
usually uncoordinated. These circumstances are certainly less conducive to
theory-building than the comparatively static international environment of past
decades. Then again, the research question approaches one of the most
politically and theoretically salient needs of our times-how to grapple with the
profound impact of technological change and the globalization of capitalism
on domestic policy choices and the process of international policy
coordination.
IV. IPR REFORM IN SEMICONDUCTORS, SOFTWARE,
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
The software, biotechnology, and semiconductor industries are
fundamentally similar in that they each involve leading-edge, information-
intensive industries that are highly international, intensely competitive, and
rapidly changing. In addition, each involves technologies that confound the
two main classes of intellectual property-patents and copyrights. Despite
these fundamental similarities, each industry has displayed a different process
of domestic accommodation and a different style of externalizing domestic
[Vol. 3:341
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regulatory reform. These variances conform to fundamental differences in the
interaction between structural market conditions and the political dynamics
associated with adversarial regulation (see table 3).
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In the case of the software industry, the shift from cooperative
multilateralism to a more coercive style of externalization with both bilateral
and multilateral elements conforms to fundamental changes over time in the
industry's market structure, the increasingly complex character of the
technology, and the gradual evolution of coalitional factionalization.
In the late 1970s, software technology was relatively new, retail markets
were only developing, and competition centered primarily on creating new
products. The very extension of copyright protection to computer software in
the Copyright Act of 1980 was intended to encourage the growth of
independent software producers and reinforce the open and fluid
competitiveness characteristic of the software industry in the late 1970s. By
design, the 1980 Copyright Act amendments set in motion a gradual
harmonization process that encouraged similar adjustments in member
nations.30 Between 1980 and 1985, other nations moved toward copyright
protection for computer programs to a strong enough degree that WIPO
abandoned its effort to draft an international treaty for IPR in software. During
this period, cooperative multilateralism was a viable and productive
externalization strategy. Other nations were moving in the same direction, and
cross-national differences in copyright protection had not yet begun to create
significant economic problems.
In the mid-1980s, however, international trade and competition in the
software industry changed dramatically, which in turn encouraged an entirely
different approach toward equilibrating incompatible national IPR laws. As
the software industry internationalized and shifted toward market-expansion
competition, U.S. firms became increasingly exposed and sensitive to foreign
counterfeiting and other difficulties caused by cross-national differences in
IPR protection for software. Under these conditions, the software industry
needed quick, widespread adaptation of copyright laws to accommodate
software as a literary work. The best route for gaining widespread change was
through the long-standing international copyright regime. However, the
regime's harmonization processes are slow, its minimum rules are quite weak,
and it entirely lacks enforcement power. Consequently, the U.S. software
industry created a powerful alliance with other copyright-sensitive industries
and pressed for wholesale reform of the multilateral copyright regime.
30. Maria R. Bloch, The Expansion of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright
Convention to Protect Computer Software and Future Intellectual Property, 1I BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 283
(1985).
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Encouraged by the near passage of an anti-counterfeiting code in the Tokyo
Round, the coalition pressed the U.S. government for what eventually became
the TRIPs proposal in the Uruguay Round, which essentially strengthened the
minimal copyright terms provided by the Berne Convention and added the
enforcement power of trade retaliation.3 In the face of strong early opposition
to this strategy, the copyright coalition encouraged the use of Section 301
tactics to develop both the substantive basis and the political support for the
TRIPs program, as well as to provide a fail-safe in case the Uruguay Round
might collapse.32 From the outset, the USTR treated the bilateral Section 301
cases and the multilateral TRIPs agreement as symbiotic exercises; the
bilateral cases were designed to convey U.S. intentions and gradually develop
a web of agreements that would substantively support the multilateral policy
goals of the TRIPs agreement.
In essence, the externalization strategy of coercive multilateralism grew
out of the high and increasing degree of internationalization in the software
industry and the unusual distribution of market share. The size and dominance
of the U.S. market has provided a platform from which U.S. software firms
have been able to compete in foreign markets. As U.S. software firms
internationalized, they became increasingly sensitive to export market access;
in this context, inadequate IPR emerged as a serious market barrier in
numerous foreign countries. In effect, the burgeoning export trade sensitivity
of U.S. producers created an imperative for rapid and widespread international
IPR reform. The international copyright regime held out the best prospect for
achieving widespread reform, although the pace of adjustment was
excruciatingly slow. Section 301 offered a channel for accelerating the
process, and the software industry had sufficient internal coherence, external
alliances, and political clout to see its preferred strategy implemented. The
result was coercive externalization, through both bilateral and multilateral
channels.
In merely five years, the United States took a relatively arcane regulatory
issue, legitimized its treatment as an important trade issue, and catalyzed what
quickly became an international consensus on substantive copyright protection
for computer software. Granted, several countries may have adopted a similar
copyright solution either for internal reasons or to remain consistent with the
31. Interviews with representatives of the International Property Rights Alliance, the International
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international copyright regime. Nevertheless, numerous other countries
(especially in the developing world) would not have moved in that direction
were it not for the coercive element of the U.S. strategy. Indeed, the United
States continues to exert pressure of this sort in its quest to improve
enforcement conditions in several countries.
Although impressive, the international acceptance of software as a
copyrightable literary work has not closed the book on copyright reform for
computer software. In the United States and abroad, the increasing complexity
of software technology and the gradual onset of market-share competition have
unraveled the former consensus on basic copyright reform. Since the late
1980s, developments in software technology and copyright law have
exacerbated the legal uncertainties inherent in the 1980 copyright settlement
and have fostered increasingly bitter disputes within the U.S. software
industry.33 Current legal and political trends indicate that the early public
concern with encouraging innovation (as voiced in 1980) has shifted to
concern with preserving competition. The complex and contentious legal
battles over interface protection and decompilation rights have fostered inter-
industry and intra-industry hostilities that foretell a major conflict over IPR
reform in the near future. In the context of domestic legal flux, little can be
done about discrepancies between U.S. copyright rules and those of other
nations, such as those between the United States and the European Union
regarding software decompilation rights.
Changes in the market structure of the software industry, in short, have
produced different IPR dynamics and have encouraged different strategies of
externalization. The widespread lack of adequate IPR protection abroad and
the increasing export sensitivity of U.S. software producers established strong
incentives for a multilateral externalization strategy; the shift from market-
creation competition to market-expansion competition established incentives
to shift from a cooperative to a coercive externalization attitude. The software
industry's current shift into a mode of market-share competition corresponds
with divisive IPR disputes that portend the end of an era of consensus in the
international harmonization of IPR rules for computer software.
Although changes in the market structure of the software industry have
directly shaped the strategy of externalization used to equilibrate U.S. and
33. Pamela Samuelson, A Case Study on Computer Programs, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECUTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 284 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al., eds.,
1993).
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foreign copyright rules, the analytical significance of market conditions cannot
be separated from the domestic politics of IPR reform. As the software case
also illustrates, the politics characteristic of adversarial regulation change as
the political and economic consequences of regulatory policies become more
acute for specific domestic actors; as policy choices move toward a zero-sum
game, coalitional conflicts can rise to the degree that IPR reform becomes
much more problematic and, consequently, much more prone to stalemate.
In 1980, the U.S. copyright system was able to develop basic IPR
protection for software technology without creating discord within the industry
and without upsetting existing IPR bargains in other industries. The 1980
copyright amendments aroused little opposition for the very reason that they
did not factionalize the software industry or adversely affect other copyright
industries. The potential for blocking the proposal certainly existed: the panel
that recommended copyright protection in 1980 was composed partly of
representatives from other copyright industries, and throughout its
deliberations it consulted a wide range of representatives from commercial
interests other than the software and computer industry. 4
However, the political and economic consequences of IPR policy typically
become more acute as technologies develop and become more mature. In the
early stages of a technology, most developments appear novel and original,
and there are few reference points from which to judge developments as either
incremental or purely innovative. Consequently, early IPR grants tend to be
broad, fairly unrefined, and politically inconsequential. As the technology
develops, its dimensions become more fully understood, and the truly novel
characteristics of the technology become more well defined. Consequently,
IPR rules tend to become more narrow and precise. Ultimately, as the
technology becomes mature, what were once innovative products or processes
become standardized, and technological change becomes much more
incremental. In this context, IPR rules tend to define important boundaries that
can have distinctly different consequences for affected industries and firms.
In the context of market-share competition, strengthening IPR rules is not a
positive sum game; stronger IPR protection may increase the competitiveness
of individual firms, but usually at the expense of competing firms and possible
the industry as a whole. Consequently, at the very time that market
competition increases the natural level of tension between firms in the same
industry, the narrowing of IPR disputes increases the potential for adversarial
34. NAT'L COMM. ON NEW TECHOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1979).
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relations between competing firms. In the context of market-share competition
in a developed technology, IPR rules begin to take on a zero-sum character:
fmns use IPR claims to protect their competitive advantage and either maintain
or increase market share, which typically comes at the expense of immediate
competitors. In the context of market-share competition, policy debates over
IPR reform shift from considerations of innovation to considerations of
competition. The evolution of IPR debates over software technologies follows
this pattern closely: recent IPR disputes over computer interfaces,
decompilation rights, and the applicability of patents indicate that policy
judgments have been shifting away from preserving innovation incentives (as
was the concern in 1980) and toward preserving competition by restraining
monopoly power.
Despite the considerable ambiguities and uncertainties in current IPR law,
neither the software industry nor U.S. legislators have pressed in any
concentrated fashion for a coherent form of sui generis protection. Instead, the
software industry has debated the terms of copyright protection, while
Congress has stood back and watched the courts struggle to secure copyright
guidelines for software technology. This situation will likely prevail for some
time, although not indefinitely. Software has been accumulating enough
unique provisions within copyright law that in many respects it already looks
like a sui generis form of protection." Many analysts and activists note that
software is getting complex enough that statutory reform may be inevitable. 6
In a sense, the reform of domestic and foreign IPR laws to accommodate
software technology has only just begun.
By comparison, IPR reform in biotechnology conforms to the early period
of software reform. The cooperative, multilateral style of externalization in the
biotechnology case is consistent with the industry's relatively low level of
35. Software has special provisions for fair use, for depositing (developers can mask out up to 40%
of deposited programs), for rental rights, and perhaps also for reverse engineering. Moreover, it is the only
form of intellectual property that can be covered by both patents and copyrights. Cf Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. §§ 101,117(1976).
36. A number of members of the IPR legal community agree with this characterization, as do
members of the USTR. Officials at the U.S. Copyright Office, on the other hand, argue that copyright law
is fully capable of handling software technology. However confident the U.S. Copyright Office, though,
unsettled legal conflicts continue to deepen the already profound uncertainty over the scope of copyright
protection. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court recently deadlocked on a crucial and widely followed case
pitting Lotus Development Corporation against Borland International Inc.; by issuing no opinion and setting
no precedent for future cases, the Court failed to resolve longstanding legal disputes over the copyright
status of user interfaces. For a brief account of the case, see Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Deadlocks
in Key Case on Software, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996, at C2.
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commercialization and generally cooperative intra-industry relations.
Although biotechnology is highly international in terms of R&D and
marketing requirements, it is still a developing technology and consequently
confers a relatively low degree of trade leverage. Because international
markets are underdeveloped and expanding, IPR disputes have not provoked
trade tensions. Moreover, biotechnology is characterized by a symbiotic and
generally cooperative relationship between small, highly innovative R&D
firms and large multinational enterprises, both of which stand to gain from
stronger patent protection for biotechnology products. Their ability to pursue
IPR reform has been aided by the lack of a contrary industry coalition, either
from the biotechnology field or from unrelated holders of industrial patent
rights. Rather, the primary resistance to increased IPR protection for
biotechnology products has come from consumer advocates and some public
sector agencies who are wary of both the ethical implications of patenting life
and the uncertain health and safety implications of new biotechnology
products. The tenuous socio-legal response to biotechnology, in the United
States as well as abroad, has counterbalanced the industry's relatively
consensual preference for expanded patent protection. Moreover, the
industry's relatively low level of trade sensitivity has not conveyed any
countervailing form of leverage. Collectively, these circumstances have been
conducive to a slow, cooperative externalization strategy that relies on the
traditional method of multilateral harmonization established by the Paris
Convention and administered by the WIPO.
IPR reform in the semiconductor industry represents the other end of the
spectrum from biotechnology, in terms of both market structure and domestic
politics. Since the mid-1980s, competition in the semiconductor industry has
existed within a fully developed market that is dominated by American and
Japanese firms, each highly trade sensitive and both focused primarily on the
U.S. market. This basic market structure has conveyed an enormous amount
of real and rhetorical trade leverage upon the U.S. semiconductor industry.
Rhetorically, the extreme nature of U.S.-Japanese competition for market share
produced a high degree of trade leverage; indeed, the very need for IPR reform
was repeatedly defined in terms of competition with Japanese semiconductor
producers. Substantively, the dependence of foreign producers (particularly
the Japanese) on the U.S. market gave advocates of sui generis reform reason
to expect that coercive bilateralism would work. Since Japanese producers
were dependent on selling in the U.S. market, they could be expected to press
the Japanese government to pass cognate IPR reforms and consequently obtain
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the reciprocal protection in the U.S. market provided by the SCPA. Overall,
in light of the serious commercial implications of IPR protection in the
semiconductor industry, Congress eventually considered the coercive bilateral
strategy worth the risk of undermining the international IPR regimes and
foregoing the certainty of regime-sanctioned harmonization.
A solely market-based interpretation of the semiconductor case is,
however, entirely misleading. The semiconductor industry reached a domestic
consensus on a sui generis IPR solution only after its preferred option,
copyright protection, was repeatedly stalemated by the vociferous and
unrelenting opposition of the American Association of Publishers (AAP). The
AAP represented a large and diverse group of industries that uniformly
opposed copyright protection for semiconductor mask works, and viewed the
proposed terms as a serious breach of fundamental copyright principles that.
would ultimately undermine their own copyright protection." The coalitional
stalemate between the AAP and the semiconductor industry played out over
several years and was essentially unresolvable. Eventually, the semiconductor
industry abandoned the copyright initiative and pursued an alternative, sui
generis solution. The unusual character of the ultimate solution is in no small
part a testament to the semiconductor industry's oligopolistic structure and its
cohesive representation through the Semiconductor Industry Association,
which formed an intra-industry consensus on a sui generis IPR solution and
pursued a coherent and politically powerful reform strategy. The serious
commercial implications of IPR reform in semiconductors gave the industry
sufficient political weight to create an entirely new category of IPR with
coercive externalization provisions.
Of course, these are but sketches of very complex political patterns,
sufficient to illustrate only the general empirical pattern of the cases. Viewed
in their entirety, the cases demonstrate how variances in international
competition and trade leverage can interact with the dynamic politics of
adversarial regulation to shape domestically and internationally contentious
IPR policy choices.
37. The AAP maintained this position throughout the legislative debates that preceded the SCPA
of 1984. See Copyright Protection for Semiconductor Chips: Hearings on H.R. 1028 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H..R. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1983); The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1983, supra note 28.
1996]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
V. CONCLUSIONS
In analytical terms, the cases surveyed in this article support two general
propositions for explaining variances in the strategies the United States has
pursued to equilibrate national IPR rules. First, the choice of externalization
strategy conforms in part to the market structure of the affected industries.
Global industries characterized by zero-sum competition for market share
convey a high degree of trade leverage, a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for supporting coercive and bilateral externalization strategies.
Industries characterized by positive-sum competition for market creation or
market expansion convey considerably less trade leverage, a condition that
tends to support more cooperative and multilateral externalization strategies.
Second, as technologies mature, domestic coalitional conflicts can rise to the
degree that IPR reform becomes much more problematic and prone to
stalemate. Under conditions of domestic legal uncertainty and coalitional
conflict, U.S. policymakers cannot easily pursue coercive externalization
strategies.
These two explanatory propositions are necessarily contingent, as they
derive from three complicated cases within one very complicated regulatory
arena, and altogether from the perspective of the United States alone. At a
minimum, the cases suggest the need for interdisciplinary analytical
approaches to studying the complex intersection of domestic regulation and
economic globalization. The particular explanatory propositions can be
developed, refined, and tested through additional cases of [PR reform, as well
as cognate cases in other regulatory areas, such as competition policy,
environmental regulation, standards, and the regulation of foreign direct
investment.
The cases and general trends in [PR reform discussed in this article also
suggest broader observations regarding both the impact of technological
change on intellectual property systems and the adequacy of existing
institutional mechanisms and political strategies for equilibrating incompatible
national IPR systems.
First, technological change clearly has been testing the boundaries of the
U.S. and other national IPR regimes. Like most complex legal-regulatory
institutions, intellectual property regimes are inherently more static than
dynamic; when faced with rapid rates of technological change, coalitional
conflict and associated legal and policy uncertainties are likely to emerge. In
the United States and elsewhere, IPR systems are being tested most severely
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by rapidly growing industries that create and/or use technologies that do not
clearly fit within existing classes of intellectual property. The software
industry alone illustrates how new information technologies challenge
fundamental intellectual property concepts, such as those of authorship,
expression, novelty, and nonobviousness. The continued controversy over the
patentability of certain forms of software, along with the failure of the legal
system to resolve such vexing copyright problems as user interface protection
and decompilation rights, suggests that statutory reform may be inevitable.
In the interim, ongoing legal uncertainty may affect innovation and
competition in the software industry or other information-intensive industries,
although to an unknown degree. In some industries, the lack of certain
intellectual property protection may not significantly affect innovation and
competition. For instance, few would argue that the fantastic technological
advancements and economic growth in the semiconductor industry derive from
the IPR certainty provided by the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984.
In the semiconductor industry, the salience of IPR protection is considerably
lower than in other industries due to industry-specific factors such as rapid
product cycles (based largely on incremental technological advancements),
enormously steep price curves, and the significance of manufacturing
capability and know-how to competitive success. The scope and terms of
intellectual property protection appear to have a stronger bearing on the
software industry; in biotechnology, patent protection is undoubtedly critical.
Eventually, deeper legal uncertainty may have a deleterious effect on
innovation and/or competition in these and other industries.
Second, much like domestic intellectual property regimes, the institutional
structure of the international IPR regimes reduces their capacity to harmonize
divergent national IPR responses to rapidly changing technologies. The
international IPR regimes may become increasingly irrelevant to important
realms of IPR law, as the widening gaps between national IPR regimes outstrip
the gradual harmonization processes fostered by the practice of national
treatment. Integrating international IPR issues with trade concepts and
institutions, such as the TRIPs agreement in the GATT/WTO, is unlikely to
speed international harmonization processes substantially: adjustment
processes are still very slow, dispute resolution mechanisms remain weak, and
the system overall is far less able to accommodate rapid rates of technological
change in new information industries than are most domestic IPR regimes. In
this context, bilateral and plurilateral trade-based strategies provide the only
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alternative routes toward resolving particular discrepancies between national
IPR regimes.
Ultimately, bilateral trade-based strategies may not be effective. For
instance, although bilateral U.S. pressure has led to significant de jure IPR
reform in many countries, effective and enforceable defacto IPR reform often
remains elusive. Such limits to policy coordination and behavioral reform do
not augur well for international policy harmonization in other, even more
contentious regulatory arenas, such as labor and health standards,
environmental regulations, and competition policy. Among the major
industrialized countries alone, policymakers are divided and uncertain about
how to harmonize national regulatory approaches to competition policy and
foreign direct investment. Policy discussions of these issues at the OECD
level remain largely formative.38 The fact that national regulatory regimes are
far more similar among the OECD member nations than between the OECD
countries and the rest of the world suggests that economic globalization is
unlikely to foster an equivalent globalization of law and regulation.
38. See, e.g., OECD, NEW DIMENSIONS OF MARKET ACCESS IN A GLOBALISING WORLD ECONOMY
(1995).
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